| Contingit autem aliquid esse eligendum secundum unam conditionem rei consideratam, quod tamen eligendum non est, omnibus conditionibus concurrentibus consideratis; et ita potuit in Angelis error electionis esse, et peccatum. | It happens that something must be chosen according to one considered condition of the matter, although it should not be chosen if all the applicable conditions were considered, and so there can be error in the choices of angels, and sin. | EI EII |
| Bonitas autem sive beatitudo est in Deo, quam habet per suam naturam, et a qua omnis creaturae beatitudo et bonitas transfunditur. Videns ergo Angelus dignitatem naturae suae, qua creaturis ceteris praeeminebat, voluit a se beatitudinem et bonitatem in omnia inferiora derivari; voluit etiam per sua naturalia in perfectionem beatitudinis pervenire: et ideo dicitur, quod sine merito habere voluit hoc quod ex meritis habiturus esset si perstitisset. | Goodness, or blessedness, is in God, which he has through his own nature, and from which the blessedness and goodness of the whole creation is transferred. Therefore the angel, seeing the honor of his own nature, in which he was pre-eminent over other creatures, wanted blessedness and goodness to be drawn from him down to all inferior things, and he also wanted to arrive at perfection of blessedness through his own natural [qualities]. And therefore it is said that without deserving it he wanted to have that which he would have had deservedly if he had persisted. | |
| Sed probabilior, et sanctorum dictis magis consona est, quod statim post primum instans suae creationis Diabolus peccaverit. Et hoc necesse est dicere, si ponatur quod in primo instanti suae creationis in actum liberi arbitrii proruperit, et cum gratia fuerit creatus, ut supra diximus. Cum enim Angeli per unum actum meritorium ad beatitudinem perveniant, ut supra dictum est; si Diabolus in primo instanti, in gratia creatus, meruit, statim post primum instans beatitudinem accepisset, nisi statim impedimentum praestitisset peccando. | But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said. For since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above, if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning. | |
| Respondeo dicendum quod tam Angelus quam quaecumque creatura rationalis, si in sua sola natura consideretur, potest peccare, et cuicumque creaturae hoc convenit ut peccare non possit, hoc habet ex dono gratiae, non ex conditione naturae. Cuius ratio est, quia peccare nihil est aliud quam declinare a rectitudine actus quam debet habere; sive accipiatur peccatum in naturalibus, sive in artificialibus, sive in moralibus. Solum autem illum actum a rectitudine declinare non contingit, cuius regula est ipsa virtus agentis. Si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis, nunquam posset artifex nisi recte lignum incidere, sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia regula, contingit incisionem esse rectam et non rectam. Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus, quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur. Omnis autem voluntas cuiuslibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis, sicut quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, ut voluntas militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate divina peccatum esse non potest, in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse peccatum, secundum conditionem suae naturae. | I answer that we must say that an angel, as much as any rational creature, if it is considered only in its own nature, can sin; and for any creature to which it belongs that it could not sin, [that creature] has this characteristic as a gift of grace, not from the condition of its nature. The reason for this is that to sin is nothing other than to stray from the rectitude of action that [a creature] should have, whether the sin pertains to natural things, or artificial things, or moral things. The only act to which it belongs not to stray from rectitude is that one whose rule is itself the virtue of the agent. For if the hand of a craftsman were itself the rule of the cut he makes, the craftsman would never be able to cut a line that was not straight, but if the rectitude of the cut were from another rule, it would be possible for the cut to be straight or not straight. The divine will alone is the rule of its action, because it is not subordinated to a superior goal. By contrast, the will of any creature does not have rectitude in its own act, unless it is insofar as it is regulated by the divine will, to which the ultimate goal belongs, just as any will of an inferior must be regulated following the will of a superior, as the will of a soldier is following the will of the army's leader. And so there cannot be sin in the divine will alone, whereas in any will of a creature there can be sin, according to the condition of its own nature. | |
| Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod illi qui ceciderunt, fuerunt de inferioribus, in quorum etiam ordine aliqui boni Angeli permanserunt. Si vero consideretur motivum ad peccandum, maius invenitur in superioribus quam in inferioribus. Fuit enim Daemonum peccatum superbia, ut supra dictum est; cuius motivum est excellentia, quae fuit maior in superioribus. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod ille qui peccavit, fuit superior inter omnes. | And following this Damascene says that those who fell were from among the inferior [angels], though even in that order some good angels remained. But if the motive for sinning is considered, a better motive is found among the superior than among the inferior, for the sin of the demons was pride, as was said above, and its motivation was excellence, which was greater among the superior. And therefore Gregory says that he who sinned was the greatest among them all. |
1. The capacious jar held a lot of peanut butter.
2. The athlete refused to accept his medal because he suspected foul play.
3. The judges had to except him from the list of winners because of this.
4. I can't wait to participate in the democratic process by voting this fall.
5. The captive princess finally escaped from the tower.
6. The sky looked dark because of the incipient rainstorm, so it seemed like a good idea to stay inside.
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