William of Ockham

On God's Power

Excerpted from Quodl. 6.4 and 6.6, Oth 9

Whether there could be intuitive understanding about a nonexistent object. That it cannot: Because there is a contradiction, that there could be vision and nothing would be seen. On the other hand, vision is an absolute quality, distinct from an object; therefore it could occur, without contradiction, with no object. And if you say that according to that argument God could be seen intuitively and beatifically, without his presence actually being exhibited to the reason of an object actually present to the intellect itself, which is false and erroneous, I answer that here there is no condition, arguing that because God can make such a vision without a created object, on which that vision would not depend except as on a secondary cause, therefore God could be seen intuitively and beatifically, without his presence actually being exhibited to the reason of an object actually present to the intellect itself, on which object that vision would depend as though on a first cause. And if you say that if someone were to see the sun and afterward go into a dim place, it would seem to him that he sees the sun in the same place and with the same size; therefore the vision of the sun remains even when the sun itself is absent, and by the same argument it would remain even if it were nonexistent, I answer that the vision of the sun does not remain, but rather some quality remains, pure sun impressed upon the eye, and that quality is seen. And if an intellect were to form some proposition like "light is seen in the same place," etc., and agree with itself, it is deceived because of that quality that was seen and impressed [upon the eye].

original latin

Utrum Deus possit remittere peccatori culpam et poenam sine infusione gratiae creatae. Quod non: Quia nullus est quin est gratus Deo vel reprobatus ab eo; sed per peccatum est homo reprobatus et per gratiam acceptus; igitur nullus est nec esse potest quin sit in peccato vel in gratia; igitur expulsio unius infert formaliter infusionem alterius. Contra: Hoc fieri non includit contradictionem; igitur Deus potest hoc facere.

Praeterea non videtur contradictio quin Deus potest dare alicui peccatori visionem suae essentiae in illo instanti in quo dat sibi gratiam; nec multo magis est aliqua contradictio quin in illo instanti in quo potest sibi dare gratiam, acceptet eum ad vitam aeternam

Praeterea non minoris efficaciae est potentia Dei absoluta super quamcumque creaturam quam virtus activa creata respectu sui effectus; sed virtus activa creata per alterationem potest reducere se ad pristinum statum; patet de aqua calida quae reducit se ad frigiditatem; igitur sine omni contradictione potest Deus reducere Adam post peccatum ad pristinum statum innocentiae, et per consequens potest sibi remittere culpam sine gratia creata. Exemplum est ad hoc, nam rex potest inimico suo remittere omnem offensam sine omni dono sibi dato et omnem culpam potest sibi remittere; igitur multo magis potest Deus hoc facere.

Praetera Deus potest suspendere inflictionem illius poenae pro peccato usque ad certum tempus, manifestum est, sine omni infusione gratiae; igitur eadem ratione potest suspendere inflictionem illius poenae in perpetuum absque hoc quod infundat aliquam gratiam, et per consequens potest remittere culpam sine gratiae infusione.