Wm. of Ockham says:
“Whether there could be intuitive understanding about a nonexistent object. That it cannot: Because there is a contradiction, that there could be vision and nothing would be seen. On the other hand, vision is an absolute quality, distinct from an object; therefore it could occur, without contradiction, with no object. And if you say that according to that argument God could be seen intuitively and beatifically, without his presence actually being exhibited to the reason of an object actually present to the intellect itself, which is false and erroneous, I answer that here there is no condition, arguing that because God can make such a vision without a created object, on which that vision would not depend except as on a secondary cause, therefore God could be seen intuitively and beatifically, without his presence actually being exhibited to the reason of an object actually present to the intellect itself, on which object that vision would depend as though on a first cause. And if you say that if someone were to see the sun and afterward go into a dim place, it would seem to him that he sees the sun in the same place and with the same size; therefore the vision of the sun remains even when the sun itself is absent, and by the same argument it would remain even if it were nonexistent, I answer that the vision of the sun does not remain, but rather some quality remains, pure sun impressed upon the eye, and that quality is seen. And if an intellect were to form some proposition like "light is seen in the same place," etc., and agree with itself, it is deceived because of that quality that was seen and impressed [upon the eye].”
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