|
On the Intellect |
Excerpted from De Intellectu et intellecto |
|
Therefore the agent intellect, which Aristotle named in the third treatise of his book De Anima, is a separate form, which neither was nor ever will be in material. And from the fact that the soul is actual intellect, all its power is for assimilating itself to intelligence that has gained intellect. It causes that essence, since it was potential intellect, to be actual intellect, and the things that were potentially understood to be actually understood. The relationship of this to potential intellect is like the relationship of the sun to the eye, which is potentially vision as long as it is in shadow. For vision is not potentially vision except while it is in shadow, but thought from shadow is potentially illumination, or actually deprivation of illumination, but thought of illumination is radiance from the opposition of what is radiant.
Cum igitur acquiritur lumen in visu et in aere et in consimili, tunc aer, cum lumine quod fit in eo, fit visus in effectu et colores fiunt visi in effectu. Sed dico quod visus non fit visus in effectu ob hoc solum quod fit in eo lumen et irradiatio in effectu, sed quia cum fit in eo illa irradiatio, fit ei irradiatio in effectu, et fiunt in eo forme visorum in lumine et fit visus in effectu, tunc imaginat formas visorum. Sed ante hoc necesse est preparari radium solis vel alicuius rei ad hoc ut fiat irradiatum in effectu, et tunc quod erat visum in potentia fit visum in effectu. Principium autem per quod fit visus in effectu postquam fuerat visus in potentia et ea quae erant visa in potentia fiunt visa in effectu, est irradiatio quae fit in visu a sole. Unde necessarium est ut ordinatio eorum quae sunt sit in intellectu qui est in effectu e converso quam est in intelligentia agente. Intelligentia enim agens primum intelligit de his quae sunt id quod perfectius est post perfectius et formae quae sunt hodie in materiis sunt in intelligentia agente forma abstracta, non quod prius fuerint in materiis et deinde sint abstractae, sed quia numquam cessaverunt ipsae formae esse in ea in effectu. Cum autem ipsa penetrat intelligendo materiam primam et ceteras materias dat eis formas in effectu quae erant in seipsa. Hoc autem quod nos principaliter intendimus sunt illae formae, sed hoc non fuit possibile hic nisi per esse generationis harum materiarum. Sed hic est quaestio scilicet quod si possibile fuit hanc formam inveniri in non materiis, tunc quod opus fuit poni eam in materiis vel quomodo de esse perfectiori venit ad esse inferius. Sed forte dicet aliquis quod non fuit hoc nisi ob hoc quod ut materiae fierent perfectioris esse. |